Legal Protection of the Unborn Child Outside the Context of Induced Abortion
Thomas W. Strahan

Association for Interdisciplinary Research in Values and Social Change
Vol. 11 No. 1 March/April 1997
Reproduced with Permission

This article reviews the current state of the law regarding the duty to protect the unborn child in the womb in the non-abortion context. Special emphasis will be placed upon neglect, prenatal torts, property law, family law, wrongful death and criminal homicide of an unborn child.

Protection of Fetal Health or Life

The duty of parents to protect their children, in instances not involving induced abortion, has been applied to the care and protection of unborn children in the womb. Cases of this type have occurred both before and after the 1973 decision in Roe vs. Wade. For example, in 1985, a New York court ordered a blood transfusion to protect the life of an 18-week-old unborn child over the objections of the mother on religious grounds based upon her beliefs as a Jehovah Witness. The court stated, "for the purposes of this proceeding, the fetus can be regarded as a human being, to whom the courts stands in parens patriae, and to whom the court has an obligation to protect.1"

Courts have ordered blood transfusions or cesarean sections to protect the life or health of an unborn child.

In a 1961 New Jersey case,2 decided prior to Roe vs. Wade the custody of an unborn child was awarded to the county welfare department after the child's birth. In this case, the court held that the parents, in refusing, on religious grounds, to consent to a blood transfusion for the child immediately after its birth, where expert medical opinion and the history of the wife's past pregnancies indicated that a blood transfusion would be essential to save the infant's life, were neglecting to provide the child with proper protection. The court held that it had jurisdiction to award custody of the child for purposes of administering a blood transfusion immediately after birth. The court stated, "It is now settled that an unborn child's right to life and health is entitled to legal protection even if it is not viable.3"

In a 1981 decision of the Supreme Court of Georgia4 involving a 39-week-old unborn child, a petition of the county hospital authorizing it to perform a cesarean section upon a mother in the event she presented herself to the hospital had been granted. Then the Department of Human Resources petitioned for temporary custody of the unborn child, alleging that the child was a deprived child without proper parental care necessary for his or her physical health.

The facts indicated that the mother had a complete placenta previa and that the afterbirth was between the baby and the birth canal. There was medical testimony that it was a 99% certainty that the child could not survive vaginal delivery and that the mother's chances of surviving vaginal delivery were no better than 50%. Delivery by cesarean section would have an almost 100% chance of preserving the life of the child as well as the mother. However, on the basis of religious beliefs, she advised the hospital that she did not need surgical removal of the child and would not submit to it and further she refused to take any transfusion of blood. The mother and father were both of the view that "the Lord had healed her body and that whatever happens to the child will be the Lord's will." The court ordered the mother to submit to a cesarean section. It cited as part of its legal authority, the decision in Roe vs. Wade, which recognized that the state has an interest in protecting the lives of unborn, viable children. This case is not an isolated instance. One study, published in 1987, found that out of fifteen reported court orders sought to compel women to undergo cesarean sections, thirteen were granted.5

In a 1995 case, decided by the Wisconsin Court of Appeals,6 the mother of a viable fetus had been confined to a hospital to protect the viable fetus from the mother's drug abuse (cocaine and other drugs). A petition for a writ of habeas corpus was denied by the Court of Appeals. The court ruled that the term "child" in the juvenile code included a viable fetus in need of protective services. The court held that this was consistent with public policy because a viable fetus had been construed to be a person. For purposes of the wrongful death statute, there was a public policy favoring assistance to the unborn, and common law should be flexible enough to accommodate itself to current medical and scientific truth.

In a 1987 case arising in the District of Columbia, a hospital sought a declaratory order permitting a cesarean section to be performed on a 28-year-old married woman who was dying of cancer and was 26 1/2 weeks pregnant. The woman was not able to clearly state her intentions one way or the other, whether or not she desired the operation. The trial court appointed counsel for the fetus and the dying woman. The District of Columbia was permitted to intervene for the fetus as parens patriae. The trial court determined that the fetus was viable and that the District of Columbia had an interest in protecting the potential life of the fetus, and that the cesarean section should be performed. The family appealed, but the decision was affirmed by a three-judge panel.7 The operation was performed, but tragically the fetus died about 2 1/2 hours after birth, and the mother died two days later.

Subsequently a motion was granted for rehearing en banc to challenge the earlier ruling. Some 40 organizations, including the American Civil Liberties Union, the AMA, American College of Obstetricians, various right to die organizations, claimed that the state had no right to compel a person to have a medical operation for the sake of someone else. The court then vacated and remanded the case and held that, where a pregnant patient is near death, the question of what is to be done should be decided by the patient. If the patient is incompetent or otherwise unable to give informed consent to the proposed course of treatment, then her decision must be ascertained through a procedure known as substituted judgment. In this case the court initially held that there was a duty to protect viable human life in the womb. However, upon rehearing, a substituted judgment was all that was required if the woman was incompetent and there was no duty to protect life in the womb.8

Family Court

Some states provide legal protection to unborn children in family law by statute. For example, under Minnesota law the requirements for a petition for dissolution of marriage or a legal separation require a reference to, and the expected date of birth of a child, conceived during the marriage but not born.9 Another statutory provision permits the court to grant temporary orders to "require one or both parties to perform or not perform, which will protect the parties or their children from physical or emotional harm.10" Another statute makes it a crime if there is a willful or deliberate failure to support a pregnant wife.11

An order for protection was issued to protect an unborn child from harm.

In a New York case decided in 1984, a County Family Court judge issued an order of protection to an unborn child, requested by the natural mother, where the mother had been subjected to physical abuse by her husband and father of the unborn child. The court ruled that the purposes of the Family Court were served by stopping violence and ending family disruption and protecting one member of the family from harm by another family member. It held that the mother had the right to give birth to a healthy baby, which did not conflict with her privacy right to freely decide what to do with her pregnancy, and in the context of the case, the word "person" may have a different meaning than in the abortion context.12

A court refused to enforce an agreement between the mother and father to procure an abortion.

In a 1988 case decided by an Illinois court, the putative father of an unborn child entered into a contract with the mother and paid her $300 to procure an abortion. However, the mother carried the child to term. The state then brought a legal proceeding to establish paternity and the father's support obligation. The father then filed a third-party complaint against the mother, demanding damages equal to any liability arising from the paternity case, based upon the agreement to procure an abortion. The court dismissed the third-party complaint and held that it was an attempt to escape the obligation of a natural parent to support his child, by indirect means, and that the public policy of the state negates the enforceability of any agreement that would operate to prejudice the rights of an unborn child.13

Criminal Homicide or Feticide

In contrast to the uncertainty of the duty to protect human life in the womb involving mothers or prospective mothers in the reproductive context, the duty of strangers to protect life in the womb is being expanded.

Most states do not rely on viability as the basis for the criminal homicide of an unborn child.

In a survey by national Right to Life Committee legal staff in October 1996, 25 States had codified a crime of killing of an unborn child (outside the context of induced abortion), as a form of homicide or "feticide." Ten of the States defined the killing as homicide at any stage of pregnancy, one State defined the killing of a fetus as homicide after the embryonic state (7-8 weeks), eight States defined the killing of an unborn child after quickening as a form of homicide, five States defined the killing of a unborn child after viability as a form of homicide, and one State defined the killing of an unborn child after the twenty-fourth week as a form of homicide.

The number of States which have criminalized the killing of an unborn child as a form of homicide, outside the context of induced abortion, has been increasing. A similar survey in 1993 found that 19 States had done so, compared to 25 States in 1996.

In a case decided by the Supreme Court of Georgia in 1984,14 the defendant had been convicted of feticide and multiple counts of armed robbery, and appealed claiming that the feticide statute was vague. The statute stated that "A person commits the offense of feticide if he willfully kills an unborn child so far developed as to be ordinarily called 'quick', by any injury to the mother of such child, which would be murder if it resulted in the death of such mother.

The mother was in the sixteenth week of her pregnancy and was standing outside a supper club, talking with other people, when the defendants arrived with guns and wearing masks. The mother attempted to hide from the defendants, but they ordered her and her companions inside the club. She told the defendants she was pregnant and begged them not to hurt her on that account. She was ordered to lie down on the floor while the others were robbed. After lying down, she changed her position slightly and the defendant fired his gun, striking her in the abdomen and causing the death of her unborn child.

She testified at trial that she had felt the movement of this unborn child on occasions, including the night before the shooting. The court held that the statute was not void for vagueness, and that the word 'quick' meant the time when the fetus is able to move in its mother's womb. It noted that medical experts "do not know a definite time when the movement of an unborn child is possible, but it happens usually around the sixteenth week and at times as early as the tenth week of pregnancy.(11) It distinguished Roe vs. Wade from the case, by stating that "here we deal with the interest of the State in protecting both the mother and the fetus from the intentional wrongdoing of a third party, who can claim no right for his actions."

In a case decided by the Minnesota Supreme court in 1990,15 the defendant was indicted for first and second degree murder of an unborn child, in violation of a State homicide statute, which defined unborn child as the unborn offspring of a human being, conceived but not yet born, and which provided a punishment of up to 40 years in prison. The defendant had shot a woman in the stomach who died from the gunshot wounds. An autopsy revealed that she was pregnant with a 27- 28-day-old embryo, which the coroner concluded had no abnormality, which would have caused a miscarriage, and that the death of the embryo resulted from the death of the woman. It was unclear whether or not the woman or her assailant were aware of the pregnancy.

A coroner was able to determine the cause of death of a 27- 28-day-old unborn child.

The defendant moved to dismiss the indictment, based on denial of equal protection in failing to distinguish between a viable and nonviable fetus or embryo and also alleged vagueness. The defendant further claimed that he was subjected to possible punishment, while others could intentionally terminate the existence of a fetus or embryo without criminal sanctions. The court distinguished between these situations, stating that fetal homicide statutes seek to protect the potentiality of human life, they do so without impinging directly or indirectly on a pregnant woman's privacy rights. The court held that the possibility that female homicide victim may be pregnant is a possibility that an assaulter may not safely exclude and, in a 4-3 decision, upheld the indictment.

In a subsequent Minnesota case decided in 1991,16 a defendant was convicted of violating the fetal homicide statute, in connection with his conviction for assisting in the suicide of his girlfriend who was 6 months pregnant. The defendant claimed that the fetal homicide statute represented an establishment of religion. The Minnesota Court of Appeals held that the statute had a secular purpose, in part, relying upon a Missouri statutory preamble upheld in Webster vs. Reproductive Health Services17 that life begins at conception as applied to tort, property and criminal laws.

In a 1994 California case, a California homicide statute, which provided that murder is the unlawful killing of a human being, or a fetus with malice aforethought, was upheld. The court, after an extensive review, held that the legislature may constitutionally criminalize the murder of a fetus without imposing a viability requirement, at least where the fetus has progressed beyond the embryonic stage of 7-8 weeks.18

Wrongful Death of an Unborn Child

At common law no recovery for prenatal injury was recognized and this was the law in the United States. In an 1888 case, decided by Oliver Wendell Holmes, which interpreted the Massachusetts wrongful death statute, recovery was denied for the death of a four- to five-month old fetus. He held that "the unborn child was a part of the mother at the time of injury" and any damage was too remote to permit recovery. This decision was followed until 1946, when a Federal court allowed the plaintiff infant to recover for injuries sustained when he was taken, as a viable fetus, from his mother's womb by a negligent doctor. Since the 1946 decision, virtually every State has recognized prenatal harm as a cause of action if the child is subsequently born alive.

According to a 1993 survey, 36 States and the District of Columbia allow recovery under wrongful death statutes for prenatal injuries, where the injury causing the death, or at least the death itself, occurs after viability.19 Ten States have denied wrongful death for prenatal injuries, unless the death followed a live birth, and four States have not yet decided, whether a wrongful death action will be permitted for prenatal injuries resulting in stillbirth. The decision in Roe vs. Wade appears to have influenced State courts to limit recovery for wrongful death from prenatal injuries, to unborn children who were viable at the time of the negligence. Therefore, a large majority of States has still retained the requirement of viability in order to recover for the wrongful death of an unborn child. Viability as criteria for recovery has been extensively criticized by legal authorities, and is diminishing as a requirement to establish a cause of action for the wrongful death of an unborn child.20 Several States have specifically stated in their wrongful-death statute, or in other legislation, that wrongful death actions are permitted, prior to viability or from the time of conception. These provisions have been upheld by the courts.

Viability, or being born alive, as the conditions for recovery for prenatal injury, has been extensively criticized by legal authorities.

Also, in a 1995 West Virginia case,21 an action was brought by the estate of an unborn child to recover for the wrongful death of the unborn child in a motor vehicle accident. The mother of the unborn child had also been killed in the same accident. At the time of the accident, the unborn child was between 18-22 weeks gestation and of questionable viability. The West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals held that there was a reasonable basis to extend the law and that the term "person" as used in the wrongful death statutes includes a nonviable unborn child, and a cause of action for the tortious death of such child is permitted.

In a 1989 Michigan case22, the mother of a 3 1/2-month unborn child was cut at work. The cut was not treated and eventually it was discovered that it resulted in hepatitis. However, the fact that the hepatitis had killed her unborn child was not discovered until the child was 8 1/2-months gestation. The mother brought an action for the wrongful death of her child. At the time the action was brought, Michigan law required that the unborn child be viable in order to recover for wrongful death. The court retained the viability requirement, but ruled that a cause of action for wrongful death was stated, based upon the time that the injury was discovered, not the date the injury first occurred, which would have meant that the unborn child was viable.

As an example of reliance on statutory authority, a Missouri court decided in 199523 that a wrongful death action was permitted for a four-month-old unborn child. In this case, Vicki Richards, who was four months pregnant, was a passenger in an automobile, which collided with a tractor trailer. The mother, and her four-month-old unborn child died as a result. The plaintiff, Jason Conner, the unmarried father of the unborn child, brought an action for wrongful death of the unborn child, against the driver of the automobile, the driver of the tractor trailer, and his employer. The court held that the unborn child was a person for purposes of the State wrongful death statute, despite the fact that the child was not viable. The court relied upon Missouri Statute Section 1.205, which stated as a canon for interpretation that conception, not viability, is the point when the legally protectable rights, privileges and immunities of an unborn child arise.

Other States, which have expressly included a nonviable unborn child under wrongful death statutes, include Georgia, Louisiana, Illinois, Missouri, and South Dakota.

Some courts have refused to extend protection to a nonviable unborn child, believing that it is the duty of the legislature to do so and not the courts. For example in a 1996 case,24 a woman miscarried six times during a five-year period. She claimed that the miscarriages were due to exposure to dangerous chemicals at her place of employment. The longest period of gestation prior to miscarriage was seventeen weeks. She and her husband brought a wrongful death action against her employer. A Federal court interpreted an Idaho wrongful death statute, which allowed recovery for the death of a person. The Idaho Supreme Court had not yet determined whether or not recovery for wrongful death extended to nonviable unborn children. The Federal court reviewed the current status of the law in the area and concluded that the majority of States permitted recovery for viable unborn children, but not for nonviable unborn children, and therefore denied recovery.

In a case decided in 1995,25 a Massachusetts court declined to extend the protection of the wrongful-death statute to a nonviable unborn child of 16 weeks gestation, although it had previously extended protection to a viable unborn child who died before birth.

Deprivation of Civil Rights

In a 1991 case decided by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals26 a child was permitted to assert a cause of action under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for deprivation of civil rights and loss of familial companionship. According to the complaint, the father of the child had been shot and killed by the defendants, when the child was a 2 1/2-month-old fetus. It was alleged that the defendants were a police "death squad", who followed those persons believed to be criminals who were escaping the arm of the law, because they were not being convicted of crimes they committed, or who received a light sentence. It was claimed that the defendants followed the child's father to a bank he planned to rob. After robbing the bank, it was claimed that the defendants pursued the robber and shot him in the back. The court permitted the plaintiff to assert the claim, because it did not arise until after the plaintiff's birth.

One Federal case has held that a 5 1/2-month-old viable fetus was a person within the meaning of 42 USC 1983 and therefore could bring an action to recover damages arising out of alleged police brutality.27 However, other similar cases have ruled otherwise. For example, in a Puerto Rican case decided in 198828, a civil rights claim of an infant, who was approximately nine months gestation at the time of alleged police brutality, was dismissed because the child was not yet born at the time of the incident, and was therefore held to be not a person.

One Federal Court has held that a viable fetus is a person under Federal civil rights law.

In another civil rights case decided in 1981,29 it was alleged that a police officer attacked a mother while pregnant and that major injuries to the unborn child occurred, which resulted in severe complications at birth, substantial medical treatment and continued medical care. The claim of the infant was again dismissed, because the unborn child was held to be not a person under the Fourteenth Amendment.

Insurance Benefits

Unborn children have been held to be family members.

In a 1988 New Jersey case,30 the mother of a child who prematurely delivered after she was involved in an automobile accident at approximately 21-weeks gestation sued her insurance company seeking expenses associated with the infant's care, treatment, and hospitalization under personal protection benefits. The preponderance of the evidence supported the conclusion that stress related to the accident caused the premature birth. The child weighed 840 grams at birth and experienced numerous difficulties associated with premature birth, such as respiratory distress, sepsis, intracranial hemorrhage and retinopathy. The court held that the unborn child was an "eligible insured person" within the meaning of the personal injury protection endorsement and was also a "resident of the same household as the named insured" (her mother), and ordered the insurance company to pay the reasonable and necessary expense of $105,387.

An unborn illegitimate child was entitled to the same legal protection as a child conceived within marriage.

In a Minnesota case of Unborn Child vs. Evans decided in 1976,31 the mother and natural guardian of an unborn child brought an action on behalf of her unborn child against the child's deceased father's parents, for recovery of the proceeds of a group life insurance policy, in which the deceased father had participated as a State employee. No beneficiary was named in the group life insurance policy. The child had been conceived at the time of his father's death but was not yet born. The child was illegitimate because he was conceived after his parents had been divorced, and the parties had not remarried. The insurance proceeds were not paid to the child, because the language of the beneficiary clause of the policy stated they would be paid to the "lawful bodily issue" of the father, and the child was illegitimate. However, the court ruled that the equal-protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prevented summary judgment against the plaintiffs and remanded the case to the trial court.

Social Security Benefits

Unborn children are entitled to receive social security benefits. In a 1975 Federal case32 brought by the natural mother and decided by the Federal Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, an illegitimate unborn child was held to be entitled to social security benefits, due to the father's death, based on the needs of the unborn child at the time of his father's death.


Under the Uniform Probate code33 a child, conceived before the testator's death, can inherit from the testator if he or she is born alive and lives 120 hours or more after birth. The child must be in gestation at the time of the testator's death. The phrase used is: "en ventre de sa mère", which literally means "in the belly of his mother." Some state statutes provide even greater recognition of the right of inheritance of unborn children. For example, one State statute says: "A posthumous child (a child conceived prior to the death of its parent, but not yet born) shall be considered as living at the death of its parent.34"

Prenatal Injury -- Workers Compensation Law

The right to recover for prenatal injury to an unborn child has been recently held not to be limited to the statutory language of the State workers' compensation law. In a 1996 California case35 a buildup of carbon monoxide gas occurred at a store, causing 21 customers and employees to fall ill and be conveyed to hospitals. This had occurred, because a buffing machine, powered by propane gas, had been used in the store without adequate ventilation and monitoring. A pregnant woman employee was among those made ill and was diagnosed as suffering from carbon monoxide poisoning.

The exposure to carbon monoxide had also occurred on other occasions during her pregnancy, which also exposed her unborn child. Carbon monoxide is known to cause deprivation of oxygen and this caused permanent damage to the child's brain and other parts of the nervous system and body. As a result, once the child was born she suffered from cerebral palsy, seizure disorder, abnormal motor function, and other conditions.

The child and her parents sued the mother's employer for the in utero damages, allegedly caused by the employer's negligence. The language of the State Workers' Compensation act did not specifically cover unborn children, and the language of the act stated that compensation was exclusively limited to the provisions of the act. However, the court, reversing an earlier 1989 decision, held that an in utero injury inflicted upon a child by the mother's employer is actionable in tort, to the same extent as any non-employee's direct injury by the employer. The court noted that more than 40 States currently recognize a right to recover for a prenatal injury, based either on negligence or on wrongful death. In this instance, the mother's employer was held to have a legal duty under tort law to an unborn child in the womb.


Several cases involving legal rights of the unborn child have involved the duties or obligations of parents. These include the obligation to protect the life and health of the unborn child, the duty to provide support, and contractual, property or inheritance rights of unborn children. These decisions have protected illegitimate children as well as children born within wedlock.

The legal protection of unborn children varies greatly depending on the specific legal subject. This has resulted in substantial criticism.(19)(20) In some states the legal duty of a stranger, who is involved in an automobile accident with a pregnant woman, and who may not know of the existence of a child in the womb, is considerably greater than that of the mother who can legally take the same child to an abortion-facility where the child's life is destroyed.

The role of viability as a requirement for recovery of prenatal injury is diminishing in the law. Viability is of only minor significance in criminal homicide statutes protecting unborn children, with most statutes not specifying any particular stage of development, or using 'quickening' as the appropriate state of development. There is a clear trend to include nonviable unborn children in the interpretation of criminal law and wrongful death statutes.(20) Legislative efforts to expand the protection of unborn children in these areas have been generally upheld by the courts. There is evidence that legislative leadership may be required, because of the reluctance of some courts to do so on their own initiative. Similarly, there is a trend away from live birth as a requirement for recovery for prenatal injury. Thus, at least for some purposes, the unborn child is treated as a member of the community.


1 In Re Application of Jamaica Hospital, 491 N.Y.S.2d 898 (N.Y. Sup. 1985) [Back]

2 Hoerner vs. Berntinato, 171 A.2d 140 (N.J. 1961); see also Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Memorial Hospital 201 A.2d 537 (N.J. 1964) (ordering blood transfusion in the event it was necessary to save the woman's life or the life of her unborn child, over religious objections) [Back]

3 Smith vs. Brennan, 157 A.2d 497,502 (N.J. 1960) ("Our criminal law regards an unborn child as a separate entity.") [Back]

4 Jefferson vs. Griffin Spalding County Hospital Authority 274 S.E.2d 457 (Ga. 1981) [Back]

5 Court-Ordered Obstetrical Interventions, Kolder, Gallagher and Parsons, 316 New England J. Med. 1192 (1987), but see In Re Baby Boy Doe, 632 N.E. 2d 326 (III. App 1 Dist 1994) (Woman is under no duty to undergo a cesarean section even in circumstances where the choice maybe harmful to her fetus.) [Back]

6 State ex rel Angela M.W. vs. Kruzicki, 541 N.W.2d 482 (Wis. App 1995) [Back]

7 In Re A.C., 533 A.2d 611 (D.C. 1987) [Back]

8 In Re A.C. 573 A.2d 1235 (D.C. App 1990) [Back]

9 Minnesota Statutes Annotated 518.10 [Back]

10 Minnesota Statutes Annotated 518.131 (i) [Back]

11 Minnesota Statutes Annotated 609.375 [Back]

12 In the Matter of Gloria C. vs. William C., 124 Misc.2d 313 (N.Y. 1984) [Back]

13 Shaw vs. Harbers, 14 Family Law Rptr. 1263, April 5, 1988 [Back]

14 Brinkley vs. State, 322 S.E.2d 49 (Ga. 1984); See also Larkin vs. Cahalan, 208 N.W.2d 176 (Mich.1973 (defining quick child as meaning viable child capable of surviving birth.) [Back]

15 State vs. Merrill, 540 N.W.2d 318 (Minn. 1990) [Back]

16 State vs. Bauer 471 N.W.2d 363 (Minn. App. 1991) [Back]

17 Webster vs. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989) [Back]

18 People vs. Davis, 872 P.2d 591 (Cal.1994) [Back]

19 Planned Parenthood vs. Casey: The Flight from Reason in the Supreme Court, Paul B. Linton, St. Louis Univ. L. Rev., Volume XIII, No. 1:15 (1993) [Back]

20 Wrongful Death and the Lost Society of the Unborn, Gary A. Meadows, J. Legal Medicine 13:99 (1992) Homicide of the Unborn Child: The Born-Alive Rule and Other Legal Anachronisms, Clarke D. Forsythe, 21 Val.U.L. Rev. 563, Spring 1987 Wyoming Fetal Rights - Why the Abortion 'Albatross' Is a Bird of a Different Color: The Case for Fetal-Federalism, Erband Mortensen, 28 Land and Water L. Rev. 627 (1993) Fetal Viability as a Threshold to Personhood: a legal analysis, 16 J. Legal Med. 607-636 (1995) The Right to Abortion: Anomalous, Absolute, and Ripe for Reversal, J. Bopp, RE Coleson 3 B.Y.U. J. Public Law 181 (1989) The Death of an Unborn Child: Jurisdictional Inconsistencies in Wrongful Death, Criminal Homicide and Abortion Cases, Murphy S. Klassina, 22 Pepperdine L.Rev. 933 (1995) [Back]

21 Farley vs. Sartin, 466 S.E.2d 522 (W.Va. 1995); see also 98 W. Va. L. Rev. 959-977, Spring 1996, for discussion of case holding [Back]

22 Jarvis vs. Providence Hospital, 444 N.W.2d 236 (Mich. 1989) [Back]

23 Connor vs. Monkem, 898 S.W.2d 89 (Mo. 1995) (en banc) [Back]

24 Santana vs. Zilog, Inc., 95 F.3d 780 (9th Cir. 1996) [Back]

25 Thilbert vs. Milka, 646 N.E.2d 1025 (Mass. 1995) [Back]

26 Crumpton vs. Gates, 947 F.2d 1418 (9th Cir. 1991) [Back]

27 Douglas vs. Town of Hartford, 542 F. Supp. 1267 (D. Conn. 1982) [Back]

28 Ruiz Romero vs. Gonzales Caraballo, 681 F. Supp. 123 (D. Puerto Rico 1988) [Back]

29 Harman vs. Daniels, 525 F. Supp. 798 (W.D. Va. 1981) [Back]

30 Sobeck vs. Centennial Insurance Co. 560 A.2d 1309 (N.J. Super. L. 1988) [Back]

31 Unborn Child vs. Evans, 245 N.W.2d 600 (Minn. 1976) [Back]

32 Adams vs. Weinberger, .521 F.2d 656 (1975); An Acquiescence Ruling was issued by the administrative agency in 51 Fed. Reg. 20,354 (1986) [Back]

33 Unif. Prob. Code, Section 2-108, 8 U.L.A. 64 (1983) [Back]

34 Minnesota Statutes Annotated 525.171 - 525.173 [Back]

35 Snyder vs. Michael's Stores, Inc., 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 105,1996 WL 537081 (Cal. App. 5Dist. 1996); see also California Penal Code Annotated Sections 3705 and 3706 requiring suspension of execution of capital punishment of female prisoner found to be pregnant until she is certified to be no longer pregnant. [Back]