More First Principles of Speculative Reason

The Principle of Sufficient Reason: Everything which is, to the extent to which it is, possesses a sufficient reason for its being so that it is capable of explaining itself to the intellect. In other words, whatever is, has that whereby it is.

In other words, whatever is, such as this broken window, has that whereby it is. It has a sufficient reason for its being a broken window. Now, it has that whereby it is, either in itself or in another. If it has "that whereby it is" in itself, then it is that whereby it is. For example, if the broken window has "that whereby it is" in itself, then just knowing that this window is broken is enough to know the sufficient reason for its being broken. I would not ask the question: "Why is this window broken?" The reason would be contained in itself. But that is clearly not the case. If we come home one day to find a window broken, we immediately enquire of the reason.

If it has that whereby it is through another, then it depends upon that whereby it is. This means that "broken window" does not contain within itself the reason for its being a broken window. The sufficient reason is outside of it. "Broken window" depends upon this outside factor in order to be a broken window.

Now when we see something existing, or moving, or changing, we enquire of the reason. If it is a moving thing, we ask about that whereby it is moving. The reason for the moving ball is the pitcher's act of throwing. But sometimes it is not enough to understand the efficient cause (the boy's arm). If a neighbor tells us that the boy down the street threw the ball through the window, we continue to search for the reason until we find the sufficient reason. It is not enough that his arm was moving and caused the ball to move through the air, thus breaking the window. We naturally want to know "why" he threw the ball. The motivating principle (end, or purpose) is also a reason or cause of the action. If he threw the ball to his friend, but accidentally broke the window, we now have the sufficient reason. But if this is not the case, we continue to search for the reason. If we find out that he threw the ball at the window because he was angry with the owner of the house, we are coming closer to the sufficient reason that explains the broken window.

To recap, everything which is, to the extent to which it is, possesses a sufficient reason for its being so that it is capable of explaining itself to the intellect.

Now as we said above, a thing has that whereby it is either in itself or in another. If it has "that whereby it is" in itself, then it is that whereby it is, and knowing the thing would mean knowing the sufficient reason for it. For example, we are not startled when a human person poses an intelligent question, because that whereby his question exists is within him. A human being is an existing intelligent nature. But we would indeed be startled were a cat to ask an intelligent question, because it is not within a cat's nature to think rationally. Intelligent questions proceed from a rational nature, not from a non-rational nature. We are not startled when a cat meows, but we would be were a plant to meow or bark like a dog.

Note the link between the principle of sufficient reason and the principle of identity: each thing is what it is. A plant is a plant, not a dog.

Denying the principle of sufficient reason simply does not work. A person can deny it, but man still enquires of the reason for things. Some people stop enquiring about the sufficient reason for being or existence. But they will have to provide a reason for denying sufficient reason with regard to the very being of things. If they cannot provide a reason, then they have no reason to complain should anyone else enquire of the sufficient reason for being. If they do provide a reason, it can only be because they have shown that the sufficient reason is contained in that which requires explanation, and all they have to do is point it out. In this case, they don't deny sufficient reason, but affirm it.

The Principle of Finality: This principle states that every agent acts for an end. In other words, potentiality has reference to actuality. If I am actually writing (actuality), then I am capable of writing (potentiality), that is, I have the potentiality to write. The writing is the fulfillment of that potentiality to write.

Every agent, if it acts, acts for the sake of an end. Acting means actualization, which is the realization of a potentiality. To act for an end is to move towards possessing or achieving that end. It is to move towards the realization or actualization of that end.

Motion or change is the fulfillment of what exists potentially. I am standing on this spot (point A), but I am potentially standing on that spot over there at a distance (point B). Movement is the realization of that potentiality. I proceed to that spot over there. I am now actually at point B.

If an agent did not act for an end, that is, for a purpose, then it would act without sufficient reason. If an agent acts without sufficient reason, then its action is unintelligible, that is, the action lacks that whereby it is. But the sufficient reason for the agent's action is the end. Why am I moving? To get from point A to point B. The end of my action is to arrive at point B.

Now we can continue to ask why it is that I want to move to point B. We will stop asking only when we come to the most sufficient reason for the movement. It is this sufficient reason, this ultimate reason, which satisfies the intellect. Hence, even the intellect acts for an end. The action of intellectual inquiry is to possess the sufficient reason for whatever it is we are inquiring about. To know is the end. Knowledge is thus the possession of a perfection (an act).

To deny the principle of finality is to deny that every agent acts for an end. But it is the end that gives intelligibility to the action. It is actuality that gives intelligibility to potentiality. When a thing achieves that end or possesses it, the action is intelligible, or meaningful. The act makes sense. For example, a man who is walking but has no idea where he is going, not even generally, is lost. His behaviour makes no sense, that is, it has no direction. To deny finality is to say that the acts of agents make no sense or have no intelligible determination. Note the word 'determination', which contains 'terminate' or 'term'. A terminal is an end, a term. An action that lacks an end lacks a terminal. But it is the terminal that gives meaning to the act, that is, intelligible determination. And without intelligible determination, one could not distinguish between one act and another act. This is very much like denying the principle of identity: everything would be everything else. Denying the principle of finality would mean that every action would be identical to every other action. In other words, every action is indeterminate, that is, without a terminal or term.

This would mean that an agent would move not from potency to act, but from potency to potency, which is not movement. This means that its action would not be an action, which is a contradiction. An action would thus not have reference to an act, but to potentiality. This would imply that the action would not be actually anything. In other words, to deny the principle of finality is to deny the principle of non-contradiction and the principle of identity. It would mean that an action is not an act, that potency is act, and that act is potency. This would mean that a potential doctor is an actual doctor, a potential pilot is an actual pilot, and an actual table is really a tree. Everything would actually be anything that it is capable of being. We could dismiss every medical student from medical school in order for them to begin to practice medicine immediately, which is of course absurd.

The Principle of Causality: Nothing moves itself from potency to act except by something already in act. In other words, every effect has a cause.

If something could move itself from potency to act, then it would both be and not be at the same time and in the same respect. In other words, to deny causality is to deny the principle of non-contradiction. The reason is that if something could move itself from potency to act, it would be both in potentiality to act and it would possess that act at the same time.

"Nothing moves itself from potency to act except by something already in act" means that a thing cannot give what it does not have. To deny this is to assert that a thing can simultaneously 'have' and 'not have' a specific perfection. If a pool ball could move itself from rest to motion, then it could impart to itself what it lacks. It would both have and not have motion. But the truth of the matter is that the pool ball receives a perfection that it lacks, namely motion, from an actually moving ball, which in turn received its motion from another actually moving ball, etc.

A living thing moves itself, for the very meaning of living thing includes self-ambulation. But a living thing does not move itself as a whole. Rather, one part moves another part, i.e., the leg moves forward and steps on point B and moves the other part of the body to point B.1

The Four Causes (Aristotle)

In order to account for change, Aristotle understood that one cause was not enough. There are four causes that go into a complete or sufficient explaination of change. For example, consider the simple change of a sculptor who changes marble from a cube to a statue of a dove. The marble is not enough to account for the change. The marble does not completely explain the new product. One requires further causes. There are four in total. These are:

In the change from marble cube to marble dove, the agent cause, or that by which there is a change, is the sculptor himself. He is the agent who moves the marble from being potentially a dove to being actually a marble dove.

But in order to carry out the change, the agent cause (the sculptor) requires something further, namely that for the sake of which he will act, that is, a reason to act. He requires a form that the marble at this point does not have, namely the form of a dove. Without a form, there is no reason to act, that is, there is nothing for the sake of which to move. "Dove" is the formal cause, or that for the sake of which the change takes place.

In themselves, however, forms do not change. "Triangle" or "cube" does not change except in as much as such forms exist in matter. In other words, only marble cubes or wooden triangles or metal rectangles can undergo change. Try destroying "triangularity" or "circularity". We cannot, unless they exist in matter. Then and only then can we destroy them, such as burn a wooden triangle in a fire, or melt a square sign made of metal. And so the sculptor cannot move to sculpt a dove unless he has before him some matter, or that from which there is coming to be.

Finally, the agent cause acts for a purpose, that is, an end. The final cause (purpose or end) is defined as that for the sake of which there is coming to be. Notice, however, that this definition coincides with that of the formal cause. That is why Aristotle points out that the final cause is twofold. There is a) the end of the generation and b) the end of the generated. The end of the generation or change is the fully formed dove in the marble; thus, the end of the generation coincides with the formal cause. The end of the generated is the ultimate purpose of his action. In other words, what is the ultimate reason why is he making a dove? We'll say he is making it as an anniversary gift to his parents. "Anniversary gift" is the end of the generated, the purpose or end of his action.

Notice that the final cause is the cause of all the other causes. It is "anniversary gift" that moves the sculptor to be an agent cause. A sculpture that lasts a day is not all that wonderful, so instead of using a type of matter that will not last, such as chocolate, he uses one that will last a long time as well as one that looks nice. And so we can see how the final cause plays a role in determining the material cause. The final cause also plays a role in determining the form. If his parents like doves and his goal is to please them with an anniversary gift, a marble dove is a nice idea, as opposed to a cobra snake or a skull.

To Deny the Principle of Causality

Think of what it would mean to deny the principle of causality. It would be like denying an agent cause for the change from marble cube to marble dove. Moreoever, it would be like denying the formal cause, or that for the sake of which there is change. It would mean that there is no reason for the change. Imagine a change that does not take place for the sake of something. That would be a change that does not take place for an end. It is a purposeless change. But a purposeless change is unintelligible; it is without reason or without meaning. One could not ask why the change occurred; for what gives intelligibility to change is precisely the end or purpose. And so one could not ask: "What is the end of the generation?" for if there is an end, one may inquire of it. Let's say the end is a knife. One may further ask: "Why was this made?" The answer is: to cut food, or, for the sake of cutting food. The end of the generated provides the reason for the knife's existence. As you can see, knowledge is possible only on the basis of causes. Science is precisely a knowledge of things through their proper causes. A scientist, such as a biologist, is constantly asking the question: "What is the purpose of this organ, or this particular change, such as this chemical reaction, or what was the cause (agent cause) of this chemical reaction in the stomach, etc?" When a scientist studies an organ, for example, he wishes to understand its form, its structure, and how it functions (what it does, that is, its purpose). To deny causality is to maintain that there are no agent causes of the various changes in the universe nor reasons for those changes (i.e., ends). Denying causality would spell the end of the scientic process. There would be no sufficient reason for things, and if there were no sufficient reasons for things, there would be no quest to possess the sufficient reasons for things, which is what the scientific process is.


Notes

1 Incidentally, this is why the will needs to be moved by an agent. The will is an immaterial power and as such, has no parts. But if an outside agent can move my will, then my act of the will is no longer mine, but the agent's, which is contradictory. That is why no external finite agent can move the will of man. Only God, who is infinite, can move the will of man without determining it. Free-choice is precisely the ability to determine oneself. God moves the will of man towards the good in general, that is, the good without qualification. The will of man needs to be moved by God, because nothing moves itself from potency to actuality except by something already in act. Man cannot move his own will from the state of potentially willing to actually willing, for a thing cannot give to itself a perfection that it does not have. [Back]

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