A second common source of problems concerns the starting point of the method of investigation (epistemology) -- or the point at which the investigation of a certain subject matter begins. There are at least two opposite scientific starting points possible: with the thing outside the mind being studied (a posteriori), or with an intellectual representation of that thing which is outside the mind, which is expressed in the mind as a concept or a hypothesis (a priori). In other words, the starting point can be either outside or inside the mind. And the questions arise: how do we know which starting point to use, and when; and how do we know that the knowledge we end up with is true or false?
Historically, the use of an a priori starting point for one's deliberations have particularly often resulted in massive failures in explaining the real world. For example, if one rejects the reality of matter or of sense cognition (which is the human faculty which grasps matter), and claims that the only real being is Form and the only human knowing faculty is Reason, then this is an a priori starting point, and one is actually precluded from starting one's investigations a posteriori with the material thing outside the mind. In consequence, the role played by sense cognition of a whole material thing (which really initiates and which is the cause of our inductively acquired knowledge of that material thing), must be relegated to something else, e.g., "innate ideas", the "Divine light" of God, or mysterious intuitions from which we then deduce our knowledge of the material world.
An associated problem concerns using very limited "models" to explain human behavior, in which the starting point may appear to be a posteriori, but in fact is not. Most investigators are genuinely and acutely aware of the limitations of their "models", and are quite correct in their arguments that we have to "start someplace". All new fields have commenced in this way. However, sometimes the limitations are not acknowledged -- or even forgotten. For example, when a mathematical formula is used in "game theory" explanations of human behavior -- especially a formula which has been perhaps invalidly transferred from one discipline to another -- does the formula or the conclusions then really represent the complex, multiple factors which are actually involved in the decision-making processes and the resultant behavior of a very complex human being (who himself is not a mathematical formula)? Or does it only represent a part of the explanation?
There is a tendency here to enter a world of pure abstractions -- and never return to the real material human subjects which one is suppose to be studying, in order to make that final check with reality. Before it is realized, the starting point of the investigation is no longer the material thing or the human being outside the mind, but rather an a priori mathematical formula or a hypothesis three or four times removed from the actual subject matter of the investigation. Mathematical concepts are not "innate ideas", or somehow magically or mystically known; rather even they are initially derived a posteriori from our investigations of the material world. Unless or until mathematical formulas can be found to correlate with the things of the world of which they are representations, such formulas and their conclusions remain only speculative. It is also easy to alter a mathematical formula in ways which are "formally" correct or possible -- but which then no longer really necessarily reflect the material things or the human beings in the world outside the mind (which they are suppose to represent).
Another example of an investigation which seems to be empirically grounded but in fact often is not is that of evolutionary biology. One simply cannot actually manipulate and investigate the actual genes of the human beings (or gorillas, etc.) of bygone ages in the modern laboratory. Most of the "data", in fact, are quite speculative, and in that sense really constitute an a priori starting point. Thus the concepts derived from these speculations are also somewhat speculative. If there are any incorrect assumptions or "observations" contained in the initial investigational speculations, those artifacts are directly transferred to the hypotheses and theories about evolution as well.
Another subtle and incorrect assumption of one's starting point as empirical concerns the extrapolation from such data and the subsequent application of it to human beings -- past or present. Although some information about gorillas and monkeys is undoubtedly helpful in understanding some aspects of human and/or cultural evolution, what sometimes seems to be missing is an awareness that millions of years ago the species barrier was crossed over from gorilla to man. A genuine substantial change had taken place! Humans were not gorillas when they began to evolve. They were already humans, with species-specific characteristics of humans, and behaved in specifically human ways -- not in specifically gorilla ways. The same can be said about present day comparisons between these animals and man.
How valid, then, is the "data" about ancient gorillas and monkeys vis-à-vis specifically human evolution? Are there any limitations to applying it to explanations of the behavior of a completely different species? Is this "data" validly extrapolated and/or applied to past or present human beings -- or gorillas, for that matter? And one final assumption concerns, again, the composition, or the definition of the evolving "material things" and of the "human beings" with which one begins one's investigation. If one assumes that these things were (and are) material only, then this is a materialistic philosophical assumption and thus in effect is an a priori starting point, as well.
These are only but a few of the questions to be posed to those who would define a material thing or a human being in terms of form only, or in terms of matter only. If they were engaged in philosophy, they would not be allowed the luxury of ignoring these questions, or of providing vague or idiosyncratic answers -- but would be required to take such questions head-on and actually justify their use of only formal or of only material definitions! How would one attempt to justify these definitions (and answers)? This question leads to the fourth source of errors attributable, at least partially, to philosophy itself.
(When we think that our concepts or hypotheses about the real world are true, what is the criterion by which we can justify this "truth" conclusion? Or are our concepts and ideas only half-truths, or fantasies? How can we know that what we are knowing about the real world is really true?
This is a question, again, about "matching". Surely there is a problem if our criterion for truth is some hypothesis the validity of which is itself at stake -- or if the criterion is conformity with some "innate idea" the veracity of which is also at stake. Even some philosophers depend solely on so-called "truth tables" which are applied to deductions from syllogisms. But how can one believe the symbolic logicians (e.g., Lemmon) who conclude that "Napoleon was Chinese" is valid, sound and true just because the form of the syllogism was correct?
It would seem that the most basic and important thing that we can do is check back with the thing(s) outside the mind which we are studying to see if our concepts or hypotheses really do match those things. Of course it is difficult to match an innate idea of Reason, a Chinese Napoleon, a complicated mathematical formula, or an isolated human gene (that somehow has been evolving all by itself) with the real world out there which we experience.
In the same way, it is also difficult to define a material thing or a human being in terms of one aspect only -- e.g., only form, or only matter -- because that does not match our empirical experience of these things. Existing material things are formed in specifically different ways according to the kinds of things they are. It is also difficult to justify the claim that either sense cognition alone, or intellectual cognition alone, constitutes the totality of the human knowing faculties -- because we really do use both when we investigate reality. Why say we only know true reality by means of the human faculty of Reason only -- when in actual practice we don't really do that? Why say we can't know causal relationships intellectually (since Hume instructs us so) -- when in actual practice we do it all the time? Certainly, at least, life scientists know it -- or they simply couldn't even do laboratory research at all! Similarly, when one checks back with the real world as it is actually experienced, we don't find a correlation with several of the proclaimed concepts, hypotheses, or theories which have just been discussed.
The question persists, then, whether or not these claims can really be justified as true. The burden is on the proclaimed to prove the veracity of his proclamations before expecting others to accept them.
Certainly not all, but much of these fractured ways of looking at reality can be traced back to our philosophical intellectual heritage. The history of philosophy is a continuous conversation, and much insight into the causes of our present intellectual situation can be gleaned by reference to it. Indeed, many of the discussions here today took place in relatively similar form way before the days of Plato.
For those who can bear a transgression at this point, I want to briefly point out two philosophical traditions which are at least partially the cause of these problems being discussed. These are the traditions of Plato, and his heir Descartes -- both "scientists", and both "philosophers". It is to be noted that each was actually precluded from accomplishing his goal because of the theoretical problems of the chorismos (or separation) inherent in each's philosophy. Their respective conclusions about reality did not in fact match the real world which we experience.
Plato (d. 347 B.C.) is an example of a genuine and sincere philosopher with rich intellectual and spiritual insights -- but who claimed certain things which he theoretically cannot justify. Plato divided all of reality into "degrees of Being".10 This structure of reality is explained by means of his famous Theory of Forms. Only the Forms were real Being; they were each a single, universal Essence, Substance, indivisible and whole -- and they "subsisted" somehow in a "transcendental world", beyond our space and time. Above the Forms -- or true Being -- was the One which was the source of the Forms, and which transcended the Forms, or Being. (This One did not create the Forms out of nothing, in our understanding of that word, because as for all the early Greeks both form and matter existed eternally).
This One of Plato was, literally, the number One (a partial bequeathment, or genetic drift, from his master, Pythagoras11), as well as the Good, the Beautiful, the Nous. Both the Forms and the One are immaterial. As the One is the source of the Forms, the Forms are the source of the material "beings" of the physical cosmos.
Matter, however was identified by Plato with non-Being (since only the Forms were real Beings). Material things were somehow not really real but only "images", "copies" of -- or only participated in -- real Being, i.e., the Forms. Our ability to know "reality", or our "Degrees of Knowledge", paralleled this structure of reality, thus ranging from absolute ignorance to true knowledge. The goal of the Philosopher King was to reach the One (or Nous) and thus finally attain universal and true knowledge of all of reality in its connectedness. Of the four "degrees" of knowledge, it will be noted, the second to the lowest degree (pistis) pertains to our knowledge of the physical universe -- or the basic sciences. This level is not considered by Plato to be a form of true knowledge, but rather still only mostly ignorance. This is because material things contained "matter" (which was non-Being) and material forms which were not real in themselves, but only "images" or "copies" of the real Forms subsisting in their transcendental world.
This metaphysical theory of Plato's, however, exhibits gaps or separations (chorismos) inherent in this view of reality. There are three "degrees" of Being represented: the One, the Forms, and the material world. Each of these levels or degrees of Being are separated from each other. There are gaps between the One and the Forms, between the Forms themselves, as well as between the Forms and the material things.
All of these levels are described by Plato himself in his various dialogues. His interlocutors attacked him with questions. How could the One produce the Forms which were isolated from the One? How could the Forms themselves blend, as Plato had required, in order to do the dialectic and reach the One -- even for the Philosopher King? That is, the human knower can never reach or know either the Forms or the One! And how could the Forms produce the material things of the cosmos if the Forms were separated from the cosmos? In other words -- how could the Essence or Being of a material thing be apart from that of which it was the essence? For example, the essence of a gorilla is not in the gorilla, but subsists apart from, separated from, the gorilla in a "transcendent world"!
This is a very rough description of the problem of the chorismos in Plato's theory. Plato himself recognized these problems and admitted himself (Phaedrus)12, that the gap problem was unsolvable. In other words, this metaphysical and epistemological theory of what reality is, and how we human knowers come to know it, doesn't work.
It is important to understand some of the consequences of this theory. If Plato's theory is true, then he has created a split picture of reality, as his questioners had so forcefully argued. There is particularly a gap between the essence or form or nature of a material thing and the matter of which the thing is composed. Even in a human being, his "soul" (nature, form or essence) is separate from his body -- and there is no communication possible between them.
This is the classical soul/body split, which was to perpetuate itself throughout philosophical history -- even though the theory doesn't work. Man is defined in terms of only one part of his whole. And the most important part of that part is his Reason -- which for Plato is the only part of the soul which is immortal. (Actually there is a three-way split, a reason/soul/body split, within man himself.) It is difficult -- if not impossible -- for Plato to explain the interactions we observe among all of man's "parts" -- as well as any interactions with the material things outside ourselves -- human or otherwise -- which for Plato were also split and unreal.
For Plato, then, theoretically a "human being" is defined ultimately in terms of a part of a part of a whole, i.e., in terms of Reason only. A "part" has now become a substance itself -- a thing all its own. If this definition is true, then we must accept the consequences of that definition. For example, the following are not real human beings or persons, because they do not exhibit Plato's definatory "rational attributes": the old and senile in a nursing home; Alzheimer's patients; Parkinsonian patients; stroke victims; comatose patients; alcoholics and drug addicts; the emotionally ill and depressed; the mentally retarded and handicapped, the frail elderly. Would you agree that these are not really human beings or persons? In fact, eventually one would have to argue that the killing of perfectly normal healthy human infants is morally justifiable -- as they are only "objects" and not "subjects", or "moral agents". (This is the argument which is in fact published by writers such as Engelhardt, Tooley, Kuhse and Peter Singer).13
Such is the effect of Plato's metaphysics on his natural philosophy, his anthropology, and his ethics. Theoretically, for Plato, the study of evolutionary biology (physics), for example, would be a waste of time, a fantasy, i.e., a cheap imitation of the Real thing: matter isn't even real. In fact, we could not even do it. And because there is no connection between our minds (or souls), and our bodies, we cannot act either selfishly or altruistically at all. We could, however, ground the practice of infanticide.
One more note about Plato. His method of coming to know "being", or his epistemology, is replete with gaps itself, because it is intimately intertwined with his metaphysics.14 On the one hand, here is a case of metaphysical presuppositions which impair the soundness of an epistemology. For example, in denying the reality of matter, Plato denied the reality of sense knowledge itself -- in effect making empirical science as we know it theoretically impossible to do. Even the sciences themselves are totally autonomous -- or separated. There is no connection possible among them. They are split apart as well. Our real source of knowledge is not through the senses, he says, but in the possession of innate ideas in our souls with which we are born and which we "remember" from a previous existence.15 In other words, having rejected the validity of the origination of our natural knowledge in the senses, he was required to look for another source of our ideas -- which he found in Reason itself.
On the other hand, Plato's method or epistemology is ultimately mathematical, and his scientific "check" on the soundness or validity of his knowledge -- the criterion of truth -- is whether or not those ideas fit into or "cohere with" a system of knowledge which is at bottom profoundly and mystically mathematical. Plato was also a mathematician, thus what we are knowing are really numbers, or mathematical objects of thought -- not the material things outside the mind.16 Can the method of one science -- mathematics -- be legitimately superimposed on other and quite different sciences? Is there only one way of knowing -- i.e., mathematical knowing? This is a case where epistemological presuppositions have impaired the soundness of a metaphysics.
Rene Descartes (1598-1650), acclaimed as the "father of modern philosophy", was also a mathematician and a physicist, as well as a philosopher. His roots go back through the mediaeval scholastics, Proclus, Plotinus -- and finally Plato (actually, back to the pre-Socratics).17 I will not elaborate so much on Descartes' system of philosophy, other than to identify him as a Platonic philosopher, and indicate some examples of the chorismos problem which he inherited from his masters. Specifically, he began his investigations with similar mental inherent splits in reality. He used a basically mathematical epistemology as well. These metaphysical and epistemological presuppositions, as I will indicate, even precluded him from accomplishing his scientific goals!
Descartes18 argued that there were only two kinds of substances in the world -- Mind and Extension -- and he defined a human being as "only a thinking thing" (i.e., an independent substance in its own right) with a material body (also an independent substance) "somehow attached" to the Mind. In other words, the material things of the world out there were only pure Extension; and a human being was "composed" of two separate substances, or things -- Mind, and Body. Here the world is only "matter", and the human being is again split into two things. And a part has, again, been defined as a whole, and a thing itself. For Descartes, animals have no Minds, no pineal gland, no souls. Therefore they cannot feel any pain, or any other kinds of sensations. Sensations and imagination were only "modes of thought". Animals, then, are only bodies, i.e., "machines", and the only sense in which they can be hurt is to "damage" them.
Descartes also considered the method of mathematics to be the only legitimate method in knowing, and he claimed that the mathematical method should be extended to investigate all of the other sciences.19 His starting point in philosophizing is also a priori (certain ideas in the mind) -- rather than the thing outside the mind to be investigated. He also rejected the validity of sense knowledge, and argued that the innate ideas with which we are born are what we are really knowing -- particularly "clear and distinct" ideas which have come to us and are "illuminated" for us by God. As he had rejected sense knowledge, his criterion for truth could not be to check back with the thing outside the mind, but had to be guaranteed by God. His proof, however, for the existence of God is a notorious failure (the "Cartesian Circle"). Because it failed, all of his other arguments (which depended on this project) failed as well. This system didn't work either -- and Descartes himself acknowledges many of his problems ("Sixth Meditation").
For Descartes, like Plato, a "human being" is defined ultimately in terms of Reason only, i.e., a "thing that thinks". Consequently, he would also have to conclude that the individuals listed previously were not human beings or persons, as well as the moral acceptability of infanticide of normal healthy infants.
What were some of the consequences20 of his philosophical system on his science? Because he was not able to successfully prove the existence of God, the validity of the fundamental laws of physics and mathematics (which was his real project) were incapable of being proven or sustained. Since he was metaphysically committed to rejecting the existence of a void, his material substance, i.e., Extension, is continuous -- and this impacted heavily on his own scientific theory of the vortex.
For example, the material world is not composed of ultimate atoms, but only of volumes, which must then move as a whole, i.e., a simultaneous movement of matter in some closed curve. Planetary motion must be explained as one, infinite, three-dimensional, continuous and homogenous extended body. If there is only one continuous extended substance which constitutes the whole material universe, then Descartes can only distinguish one body from another body in terms of differential volumes and secondary qualities! Consequently he cannot have a definition for "density", or for "viscosity". Further, Descartes omits "matter" from his definition of motion. Motion = speed x size (but, "size" is a continuous volume of body!). Thus his physical laws of impact are actually in error. Again, he cannot isolate a particular force (e.g., gravity) in terms of how a body would move if it were free from resistance, because to imagine it moving without resistance is to imagine it in a void -- the existence of which he had previously rejected.
Such is the impact of certain metaphysical and epistemological presuppositions on a philosopher's -- and mathematical physicist's -- study of natural philosophy, anthropology, and ethics. With such a "human" split we theoretically cannot even do science. Nor can we even be selfish or altruistic. The only important thing is Reason or "thinking" -- and we can't even do that. With this unbridgeable gap between his Mind and his Extension, Descartes' legacy to us was a stream of either overly rationalistic or overly materialistic (or empirical) philosophical frameworks from which we view and analyze reality. Even today we are drenched with the living impact of his philosophical presuppositions, drawn from a theory which doesn't even work.
As chorismos defines a splitting or breaking apart, zygon21 defines a coming together or "bridging". I will argue that within a different philosophical framework, the cup is both half-empty and half-full. Not one or another science is autonomous -- but all of them are connected, because they are all studying the same reality -- only from different aspects. Our natural knowledge of not only the material world and human beings, but of all of the "sciences" derives from or finds its starting point in the empirical sciences -- including our natural knowledge of God. Ethics (including altruism) will be found to be objectively based on the real nature of the human being. Because that nature is not split in reality, this metaphysical and anthropological precision rejects an is/ought split. Human nature is teleologically or goal orientated, and there are things we should do or not do to reach those goals -- based on what is helpful or harmful to that very human nature. Human nature is also complex, and so grounds "oughts" on all three aspects or levels of our human nature -- i.e., selfish, altruistic and charitable "oughts". Because human nature is both determined and "free", it possesses some capacity to deliberate -- based on information it takes to be true -- and choose (based on that deliberation) which actions it will or will not do to attain its goals. Again, evolutionary human biology and cultural evolution are really studying the same thing, only in different ways, i.e., complex human beings who have evolved materially in a specifically human (formal) way, and influenced in that evolution by behaving and acting on the formal information learned individually and collectively, as passed down through our cultural institutions.
To understand this requires some philosophical precisions -- which I will only touch on today. It requires a completely different definition of "a material being" and therefore of "a human being". It is to see that in any whole material thing there is not only matter, but form as well; it is to see that in a whole human being there is not only form but matter as well; and it is to see even a third and completely different aspect within each composite whole thing. For both material things and human beings exist or did exist. Thus not only matter and not only form -- but also the act of existing (esse), which is accidental to these things, must be included in the definition of each of these whole things.
One further point about this act of existing, or accidental esse. As with matter and with form, this act of existing is a natural component of a material and human being. It explains our own imperfections and contingencies -- as well as our natural need and openness to the other beings of this world. And it is our naturally know trajectory to God who is the original and necessary cause of creation, and who is naturally known through that creation. As Scripture relates to us, He is "known [by us human knowers] by the things that are".22 Thus I will focus first on some new definitions -- especially the definitions of "a material being" and of "a human being". Each definition will include matter, form and the act of existing. These considerations will have an impact on our understanding of evolution.
Next with the clarification of the definitions of "whats" or things (natural philosophy), I will move briefly to the epistemological issue -- or methods of "how" to know reality. I will argue that within this different philosophical system, each "science" can and does contribute necessarily and essentially to our collective enterprise of knowing what reality is, and especially the part we play in that enterprise as humans. It is, indeed, a division of labor I am talking about -- now on the modern professional scale. We are all working for a common purpose. To leave out of consideration the contributions of any of the "sciences" -- including the empirical sciences, philosophy or theology -- is to abstract too precisely from reality as a whole. It is, again, to make a "part" a whole in itself, and to effect a separation again. These considerations will have an impact on our understanding of the differences and yet the connectiveness of the various sciences.
I have already in fact indicated the impact of such too precise an epistemological abstraction on our understanding of material things, human beings, and how and if they should or could act. Indeed, I would argue that partly because of too precise an abstraction a gap has found its way down into ethics in the guise of the "is/ought" split. The "is/ought" split is a chorismos by any other name!23 These considerations will have an impact on our understanding of ethics and human behavior -- especially altruism.
To bridge these gaps, then, we need not only understand how to redefine reality correctly, but also how to come to know reality differently. We need to know -- as a "whole" human knower -- when it is appropriate to abstract with such precision, and when it is not. Epistemologically, then, we need to understand to abstract without precision from reality as well. I am arguing here for the acknowledgment of different kinds of knowing24 all of which are based on the real nature of the world and our own real natures as human knowers. It is to validate different kinds of knowing -- each legitimate in its own sphere, each illuminating other spheres -- but each limited in its effectiveness and scope.25 In other words we are all trying to explain reality -- the ultimate "whole" -- but each of our disciplines is studying only a part of the whole. Please bear with me as I sketch out the outline of an alternative framework with which to approach reality. Note the impact this framework will have on our understanding of science, philosophy, theology -- and altruism.
There are several definitions26 which are critical in understanding how to put the pieces back together. Again, I would argue that the definition of "a definition" is a description of all of the aspects, or components, which are necessary in order for a single, individual whole thing to exist.
Briefly, a "substantial form" is that aspect of a whole thing which determines something to be a certain kind of thing (e.g., species).27 For example, it distinguishes birds from gorillas, fish from humans, plants from planets. It is also the cause of specifically characteristically kinds of actions or functions that are associated with that kind of thing. Scientists study these forms, for example, when observing that "function follows form",28 or that birds can fly -- but peas and giraffes can't. "Accidental forms" are those aspects of a whole thing which further determine a certain kind of thing in secondary and unessential ways. For example, a bull dog is brown, with white markings, short with a stubbed tail. The terms "substantial" and "accidental" are also used in a related way in describing change -- a phenomenon in which we are all interested. A substantial change is a change in the very nature of a thing. For example, the evolutionary changes from one species to another; or in fertilization when the egg and the sperm unite to change to a zygote. An accidental change is a change in only a non-essential aspect of a thing. For example, a change in color or the developmental stages of an organism. It is not a change in the nature of the thing.
"Matter" is not equated with mass or quantity (quantity is really an accidental form). It is that aspect of a whole thing which is determined to be a certain kind of thing by the form. And the act of existing is that aspect of a whole thing which determines the whole thing to be, or to exist. The act of existing, or esse, is not a form (or a "what", like a noun), but an "-ising" (like a verb).
When you put these aspects together you have a single whole material kind of thing -- with different aspects. It is, to return to the linguistics,29 like a participle, i.e., a "being-that-is-being". This is a fundamentally and radically dynamic understanding of all material beings. As Wilhelmson has phrased it, they are "beings-on-the-march".30 No one of these aspects can exist or act on its own -- but each aspect can be studied or mentally considered individually or in combination. And when this being acts, the whole thing acts.31
Note how different now the following definitions are. A "material thing" -- like the presently existing things biochemists study in their laboratories, and the things that now and used to exist which the evolutionary biologists study -- is not simply defined in terms of one single isolated component -- i.e., matter alone, or form alone -- but in terms of several components. All together these constitute the thing's nature. There is no split among the several aspects; all together they constitute one thing which acts.
Therefore, to understand how or why a certain material thing functions or acts as it does, or did, one has to consider all of its components, components which effect each other in a kind of interacting relationship.
In addition, each of these aspects is operating in a particular individual thing. Thus each of those aspects is particularly unique, although specifically similar. All gorillas do not share or participate in little portions of a great single Form of "Gorilla-ness". Rather, each particular gorilla has in its concreteness its own version of "gorilla-ness", i.e., mostly the same as other gorillas, but a little unique to each single concrete gorilla of the same species. The same in true of the other aspects -- i.e., the accidental forms, the matter and the existing.
This is why we need a concept of material things that can express and capture both the similarities and the differences at once. They can not be expressed in a univocal concept of "gorilla", nor in a quasi-equivocal concept. Only an analogical concept can capture and express the similarities and differences which really constitute things as they really are. An analogical concept is even a little vague, or "fuzzy". To that end it is just the opposite of Descartes' "clear and distinct ideas"!
This substantial form is also not a perfect form. All material forms are imperfect; indeed that is why they need matter to help them actualize, flourish, progress towards ever fuller perfection. Here matter is not an "evil", nor a "nothing" -- but a real essential and necessary component of a material thing -- and therefore required in its definition.
The other important definition is that of "a human being". Again, it is not defined solely in terms of the substantial form or "humanness" -- but in terms of all of its aspects - including matter.32 I want to repeat that matter is an essential part of the definition of "a human being" because it is an essential requirement for a human being to exist. As before, all of the components of each individual, particular concrete human being are unique to itself, and so the concept of "a human being" must be an analogical one as well.
The substantial form (or "soul") of a human being, too, is not perfect, but needs the human body to help it actualize or flourish. Even all of the powers of the soul -- i.e., the vegetative, sensitive and rational powers -- must all be there together and together with the body as one unique thing. No splits; no free-standing Reason, Mind or Matter. Thus each of these components must work together "as a team" in order that that a "human being" can survive and reach his/her goal. In this scheme the "soul" or even "reason" does not exist only in the heart or the brain -- but in the whole human being.33 Thus -- when the human being thinks or learns or knows -- the whole human being thinks or knows.
Finally, the act of existing (esse) of each human being is that aspect which determines a human being to be, to exist. All material things come and go -- exist and then not exist. That is, this "existing" aspect of a material thing is really accidental or contingent. The same is true of human beings. The act of existing also explains our openness to other creatures. And it is, indeed, this component which is our trajectory to God, for neither the matter nor the form of a thing can explain this peculiar aspect of existing which is so contingent or accidental to a thing.34
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B. Epistemology and What the Human Faculties are Knowing
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